Abstract. We investigate robustness of correlated networks against propagating attacks modeled by a susceptible-infected-removed model. By Monte-Carlo simulations, we numerically determine the first critical infection rate, above which a global outbreak of disease occurs, and the second critical infection rate, above which disease disintegrates the network. Our result shows that correlated networks are robust compared to the uncorrelated ones, regardless of whether they are assortative or disassortative, when a fraction of infected nodes in an initial state is not too large. For large initial fraction, disassortative network becomes fragile while assortative network holds robustness. This behavior is related to the layered network structure inevitably generated by a rewiring procedure we adopt to realize correlated networks.
Other attacks to networks may occur as propagating processes such as computer viruses do [13, 14, 15] . Let us consider the susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) model with infection rate λ (and recovery rate µ = 1) on a network. The system has, in general, two critical infection rates λ c1 and λ c2 [16, 17] . Above the first critical infection rate λ c1 , a global outbreak of disease occurs. In a global outbreak, a fraction of the nodes become infected and eventually removed. The remaining network of susceptible nodes, however, may survive as a giant component up to the second critical infection rate λ c2 , above which the network is finally disintegrated. Thus we here adopt λ c2 as a measure of robustness against propagating attacks [17] . Note that λ c2 is in principle equal to or larger than λ c1 .
In [18] , the first critical infection rate λ c1 is approximately derived. In particular, any positive infection rate induces a global outbreak in SF networks having γ ≤ 3, meaning λ c1 = 0. Newman studied the SIR model on uncorrelated networks in terms of transmissibility to show that λ c2 > 0 even for γ ≤ 3 [16] . Hasegawa and Masuda extended his analysis to evaluate the robustness λ c2 in some vaccinated networks [17] .
Real networks often have some degree correlations [19, 20] . A network is said to be assortative when nodes with similar degrees tend to connect with each other. A network is called disassortative when nodes with high degrees tend to connect to nodes with low degrees. Empirical data indicates that social networks are likely to be assortative, while technological networks and biological networks to be disassortative [19, 20, 2] . Degree correlations affect dynamics on networks. Previous studies have reported the effects of the degree correlations on various dynamics, e.g., percolation [21, 22] , target attack [23, 24] , Ising model [25] , susceptible-infected-susceptible model [26] , information spreading [27] , etc. As for the SIR model, Vazquez and Moreno showed that the increase of the assortativity makes easier to induce a global outbreak [28] . However, we do not know the effect of the degree correlation of networks on the robustness against such propagating attack modeled by the SIR model.
In this paper, we perform a Monte-Carlo simulation for the SIR model on networks having a degree correlation.
We numerically determine λ c1 and λ c2 to show that correlated network is robust compared to the uncorrelated one regardless of whether it is assortative or disassortative, when a fraction of infected nodes in an initial state is not too large. For large initial fraction, disassortative network becomes fragile while assortative network holds robustness. This behavior is related to the layered network structure inevitably generated by a rewiring procedure we adopt to realize correlated networks [25, 29] .
Model
We consider the SIR model on a given network with N nodes. Each node takes one of the three states: susceptible, infected, or removed. A fraction p seed of the nodes are initially infected and other nodes are susceptible. Susceptible nodes get infected at a rate proportional to the number of infected neighbors: the susceptible node gets in-fected with probability λ∆t within a short time ∆t when it is adjacent to an infected node. An infected node becomes removed, irrespective of the neighbors' states, at a unit rate µ = 1, i.e., with probability ∆t within short time ∆t.
In the final state, each node takes either susceptible or removed state. We call the connected components of removed nodes and susceptible nodes the infected networks and the residual networks, respectively. Then, the critical infection rates λ c1 and λ c2 are given in terms of percolation transition. We define R max (N ) and S max (N ) to be the mean largest component sizes of the infected networks and residual networks, respectively. Noting that an infection quickly dies out (spreads globally) for λ < λ c1 (> λ c1 ) and the residual networks include a giant component (consist of only finite components) for λ < λ c2 (> λ c2 ), we expect that R max (N ) and S max (N ) behave as
In the following sections, we perform Monte-Carlo simulations for the SIR model on the uncorrelated and correlated networks. Here we adopt the following degree distributions: an exponential degree distribution,
and a SF degree distribution with γ = 3,
Note that those networks have the same average degree
An uncorrelated network having the above distributions can be generated by the configuration model [2] .
The network so obtained is then randomly rewired so as to have a correlation without changing the degree distribution. We adopt the following scheme proposed in [25, 29] Here we adopt the following quantity for a measure of the degree correlation [29] :
where E kk is the probability that both ends of a randomly chosen edge have degree k, and E r kk is that of the uncorrelated networks (with the same degree distribution). Uncorrelated networks take A = 0, and a network is regarded as assortative (disassortative) when A > 0(< 0). After the above process, the mean value of A takes a p rewiredependent value. Choosing p rewire appropriately, we have a network with a desirable degree correlation. To determine the critical points, we introduce the fractal exponents ψ R and ψ S of the infected and residual networks defined by [30, 31] 
respectively. Noting that Eq.(1), we expect
For numerical computations, we evaluate the effective exponents of finite N :
Then, ψ R (N ) and ψ S (N ) with several sizes cross at λ = λ c1 and λ = λ c2 , respectively.
By using data of Fig. 1(a) , we plot the effective fractal exponent in Fig. 1(b) . We have a crossing point of ψ R (N ) at λ c1 ≈ 0.05, and of ψ S (N ) at λ c2 ≈ 0.72. At the crossing points, the corresponding fractal exponents take the same value ψ R,c = ψ S,c = 2/3. The property that the largest component size at criticality is proportional to N 2/3 is also observed in the mean field SIR model [32, 33] and percolation of the random graph [34] .
We further determine the critical exponent by using a finite size scaling. For R max (N ), we assume the following scaling form [31] :
where f (x) is a scaling function satisfying and (d). For both plots, the fitting parameter β is taken as β = 1. This indicates that these transitions are in the mean field universality class. Similar scalings for the mean cluster sizes of the residual and infected networks are also assumed in a similar way [31] . We have a good data collapse for both by setting β = 1 (not shown).
The results for the SF network are shown in Fig.2 . As is fragile compared to the random graph with the same average degree [17] . The same analysis is performed with several initial seed fractions p seed = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7. Our simulations indicate that the SF network remains fragile in this range of p seed . In Fig.2(c) , our scaling result shows that the transition of residual networks belongs to the mean field universality class, β = 1, even when the network is scalefree with γ = 3. Here we assumed ψ S,c = 2/3. Although our numerical data ( Fig.2(b) ) seems to be less precise due to small samples, we performed a similar analysis for a dynamic percolation in the same universality as the SIR model to show precisely ψ S,c = 2/3 for that model (not shown).
Result: Correlated Case
We performed similar simulations on correlated networks with several degree correlation A. Here A takes a value in a range [−0.1, 0.5].
The critical infection rates λ c1 and λ c2 of the network with the exponential degree distribution are plotted as a function of A (Fig.3) . As expected in [28] , λ c1 decreases when A increases ( Fig.3(a) ). On the other hand, we observe a nontrivial behavior for λ c2 (Fig.3(b) ). For p seed = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, the uncorrelated network is most fragile: λ c2 increases when the network is correlated, regardless of whether it is assortative or disassortative. This tendency decreases with the increase of p seed , and we did not observe such a behavior for p seed = 0.7. There, a disassortative network is fragile than the uncorrelated one. Figure   4 is the result for SF network. We can observe a similar The above behavior of λ c2 is due to the layered network structure of correlated networks [25] . In Previous studies for epidemics on complex networks have mainly focused on the (first) critical infection rate λ c1 , above which a global outbreak occurs. Instead, we have focused on the second critical infection rate λ c2 in this paper. In particular, it is important when we consider epidemics on community networks, where we should distinguish local epidemics, i.e., an outbreak confined in a single community, and global epidemics, i.e., epidemic spreading through the whole communities [35] . We expect that the robustness against propagating attacks will be a good measure for searching effective vaccines in community networks. 
